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To what extent do migrants carry their culture with them, and to what extent do they acquire the culture of their new
home?The answer not only has important political implications; it also helps us understand the extent to which basic
cultural values are enduring or malleable, and whether cultural values are traits of individuals or are attributes of a given
society. The first part of this article considers theories about the impact of growing social diversity inWestern nations.
We classify two categories of society: Origins (defined as Islamic Countries of Origin for Muslim migrants, including
twenty nations with plurality Muslim populations) and Destinations (defined as Western Countries of Destination for
Muslim migrants, including 22 OECD member states with Protestant or Roman Catholic majority populations).
Using this framework,we demonstrate that, on average, the basic social values of Muslim migrants fall roughly midway
between those prevailing in their country of origin and their country of destination. We conclude that Muslim
migrants do not move toWestern countries with rigidly fixed attitudes; instead, they gradually absorb much of the host
culture, as assimilation theories suggest.
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One of the most striking developments in the modern era of globalization is the rapid flow
of people across national borders. The United Nations estimates that, in 2005, 191 million
migrants lived outside their country of birth (roughly 3 per cent of the global population)
(UNDESA, 2006). This figure has doubled since 1960 and continues to rise; today the
estimate is close to 200 million (IOM, 2008).Most move toWestern societies; just over two
dozen countries of destination, mainly in Europe, North America and Asia, absorb almost
three-quarters of all migrants around the world. In 2005, among all world regions, Europe
hosted the largest number of international migrants, who represented almost one-tenth of
Europe’s total population (OECD, 2008).
The rapid settlement of Muslim migrants into European societies, in particular, has raised
important challenges for how European policy makers manage cultural diversity, maintain
social cohesion and accommodate minorities (Fetzer, 2004;Heckman,2005).Recent events
have intensified concerns about the integration of Muslim populations: (1) sharp ethnic
tensions arose in the Netherlands after the murder of film-makerTheo van Gogh by Islamic
extremists in November 2004; (2) heated protests broke out in many countries, following
the September 2005 publication of the ‘Muhammad’ cartoons in Denmark: the cartoons
were seen as blasphemous in Islamic countries, while demands for their suppression raised
concerns about freedom of expression inWestern countries; and (3) violent riots occurred
a few months later in suburban Paris housing projects involving disaffected Franco-
Maghrebi communities. These concerns were heightened by a series of extreme terrorist
events, particularly by 9/11 in the United States, and the bombings directed against civilian
targets in Madrid (2004), London (2005) and, more recently, Mumbai (2008) (Coolsaet,
2008). The UK was shocked that British-born second-generation Muslim youths of
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Pakistani and Jamaican descent, with good education and job prospects, were the perpe-
trators of the London bombings. These events raise fears that second-generation Muslims
living in isolated urban communities are becoming alienated from democratic societies and
may be developing closer sympathies with extremist Islamic movements. For some observ-
ers, disaffected Muslims in France, the UK or the Netherlands are seeking to create a society
entirely separate from the mainstream (Bawer, 2007).
This backdrop highlights the importance of the broader research question that this study
addresses: how far do migrants carry their culture with them, and to what extent do they
acquire the culture of their new setting? The answer not only has important political
implications; it also helps us understand theoretical debates about whether basic cultural
values are enduring or malleable; and whether cultural values are traits of individuals or
attributes of a given society.
To explore these issues, the first part of this article considers alternative arguments about
the potential consequences of the experience of migration for cultural change. Theories of
cultural integration suggest that immigrants gradually absorb the values and norms that
predominate in their host society, especially on an intergenerational basis. By contrast,
theories of divergence suggest that distinctive social values and norms are enduring and
deep-rooted within each nation, shaped by collective histories, common languages and
religious traditions, so that migrant populations are unlikely to abandon their cultural roots
when they settle in another country.We propose to test these claims by examining whether
the basic values of Muslim migrants are closer to those prevailing in their societies of origin
or destination. The second part describes the research design and the empirical evidence
used in this study, drawing upon theWorldValues Survey/EuropeanValues Study (WVS/
EVS) data set, pooled across five waves from 1981 to 2007. The study compares two types
of society: Origins (Islamic Countries of Origin for Muslim migrants, comprising twenty
nations with plurality Muslim populations) and Destinations (Western Countries of Destination
for Muslim migrants, comparing 22 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD) member states with Protestant or Roman Catholic majority populations)
(see Figure 1).1
Cultures have multiple dimensions and this study focuses on four important indicators.
We analyze attitudes towards gender equality and sexual liberalization, areas in which
previous research has demonstrated that a cultural cleavage divides Islamic and Western
societies (Norris and Inglehart, 2004; Pettersson, 2008). Muslim practices of forced mar-
riages, polygamy, domestic violence and honor killings, as well as patriarchal beliefs about
the traditional roles of women in the family, and the symbolic wearing of the hijab,niqab and
burqa, have proved controversial by conflicting with the more egalitarian gender roles, the
liberal social values and the secular legal frameworks prevailing in Western countries
(Bowen, 2008; Roggeband, 2007).We also compare religious values, where we expect to
find strong contrasts between Muslim migrants and the increasingly secularWestern publics
(Norris and Inglehart, 2004). Lastly, the study compares democratic attitudes, representing
important components of civic integration for new citizens in Western countries. Multi-
cultural theories argue that migrants should be engaged in the rights and responsibilities of
democratic citizenship in their host societies, even though they should be free to maintain
distinct cultural identities, practices and beliefs (Kymlicka and Bashir, 2008).
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To analyze the underlying drivers of cultural integration,we examine whether the values
under comparison can be explained by: (1) individual-level Muslim religious identities, con-
trolling for many factors that may shape both social values and transnational mobility,
including levels of education and socio-economic status, marital status, labor force partici-
pation, religiosity, age and gender; or (2) living within Islamic orWestern societies, at macro level,
controlling for world region. Hierarchical linear models (HLM) are employed, specifically
multi-level regression analysis, as the most appropriate technique for examining the strength
of both macro-level and individual-level data simultaneously (Bickel, 2007; Gelman and
Hill, 2007; Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002). Updating and extending previous research, the
results presented in the third part highlight two major findings.
First, as expected, compared with Western nations, Islamic societies prove highly con-
servative on issues of sexuality and gender equality, including support for egalitarian roles
for women in the home, workforce and public sphere. Islamic societies are also far less
tolerant towards issues of sexual liberalization, as manifested in their attitudes towards
abortion, divorce and homosexuality. Not surprisingly, Islamic societies are also strongly
religious in their values, while by comparison most Western countries are almost always
more secular. Based on comparing a broader range of Islamic countries, these results update
and support findings reported in the previous literature (Inglehart and Norris, 2003b;
Norris and Inglehart, 2004).
But this phenomenon does not mean that Muslim immigrants living within Western
societies share identical traditional values with their counterparts living in Islamic societies;
instead, the analysis demonstrates that the basic values of Muslims living inWestern societies
fall roughly halfway between the dominant values prevailing within their countries of
destination and origin. This suggests that migrant populations living in Rotterdam, Brad-
ford and Berlin are in the process of adapting toWestern cultures, while at the same time
continuing to reflect the values learned through primary socialization in their countries of
origin. The multi-level models used for analysis in this study, controlling for many other
Figure 1: The Typological Classification
Notes: ‘Islamic countries of origin’ were classified as those with a plurality Muslim population. ‘Western countries of destination’
were defined as OECD member states with a plurality Protestant or Roman Catholic population. Within each category, individual
Muslims, non-Muslims and Christians were defined by individual religious identities, as monitored in the pooled World Values Survey,
1981–2007.
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social characteristics, show that living within an Islamic orWestern society has a far stronger
imprint on values than individual-level religious identities, or indeed the effects of an
individual’s education, age, gender and income. Some previous studies argue that Muslim
migrants encounter particular difficulties with cultural integration into European societies
(Bisin et al., 2008).By contrast, the results of the analysis are largely consistent with previous
studies based on other populations, such as the integration of Mexican migrants into the
US, suggesting that common underlying processes are at work (Díez Nicolás, 2003;
Moreno, 2005).
In interpreting these results, we suspect that, in the short term, one reason why Muslim
migrants express values located between their countries of origin and destination may be
self-selection: people already sympathetic towardsWestern cultures, as well as those with the
higher skills and status that facilitate mobility, are more likely to relocate to live in affluent
post-industrial societies.Nevertheless, in the long term there is probably a reciprocal process
at work, especially for the second and third generations of migrant families. Our overall
view of these findings is that Muslim migrants do not come to Western countries with
rigidly fixed attitudes; instead, they gradually absorb the values prevalent in their host
society, as assimilation theories suggest. The fourth part summarizes the key conclusions
and reflects upon their broader implications.
Context, Theoretical Framework and Literature Review
The rate of population migration has accelerated sharply worldwide as part of the phe-
nomenon of globalization – the process of expanding networks of interdependence span-
ning national boundaries that follows the increasingly swift movement of ideas, money,
goods, services, ecology and people across territorial borders (Held et al., 1999; McGrew
and Held, 2007). Globalization is understood here as multidimensional, encompassing
economic aspects, such as the flow of trade, labor and capital; social aspects, such as interper-
sonal contacts and mediated information flows; and political dimensions, including the
integration of countries into international and regional organizations. In particular, the flow
of peoples across national borders has risen due to trade liberalization, economic integration
and more open labor markets, as well as international travel and communications, while
inter-state wars and internal conflicts have expanded the number of displaced populations
and refugees.Western societies are becoming increasingly socially diverse, yet paradoxically
the expansion of cosmopolitan communications flowing across state borders has simulta-
neously weakened the hegemonic control once enjoyed by the major national agencies of
cultural transmission, notably domestic television broadcasting channels, within each
country. Cosmopolitan communications facilitate multiple information networks linking
together the lives of strangers from distant lands, a process that has changed the way we learn
about, and interact with, people and places beyond the borders of our country (Kivisto,
2002; Schönpflug, 2009).
These developments have touched all parts of the globe, but Western democracies, with
high demand for labor and liberal human rights policies, remain the most attractive
destination for migrants and refugees. In 2005, the International Organization for Migra-
tion (IOM) estimates that, among all world regions, Europe hosted the highest number of
international migrants (70.5 million), followed by North America (45.1 million) and Asia
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(25.3 million). At the dawn of the twenty-first century, about one in four or five residents
in countries such as Australia (24 per cent), Switzerland (24 per cent),New Zealand (19 per
cent) and Canada (18 per cent) were foreign born, as were one in eight in Germany (13 per
cent), the United States (13 per cent) and Sweden (12 per cent) (OECD, 2008). In 2005,
just 28 host countries absorbed three-quarters of all migrants worldwide. Social diversity is
further reinforced by demographic trends; immigrants from developing societies often have
younger age profiles and higher fertility rates than is common inWestern countries. Since
2008, the global economic downturn and rising job losses have slowed the demand for
low-skilled service labor and migration flows into Western countries, but it is not yet
apparent whether this has substantially reversed earlier trends (IOM, 2008).
Due to these developments, European countries that used to be relatively homogeneous
in their cultural heritage, historical traditions, ethnic composition, language, lifestyles and
religious faith – such as Denmark, France and Sweden – have become far more socially
diverse today (Hunter, 1998; 2002; Israeli, 2008). Eurostat reports that in 2007 foreign
nationals represent one in four (41 per cent) people living in Luxembourg and one in five
living in Switzerland (21 per cent) and Latvia (19 per cent).2 Part of this is due to
inter-regional mobility within the internal European market, as EU nationals choose to live
or work in other member states; the French financial community in Kensington, the British
expatriate community in Tuscany or Polish laborers in Spain and Ireland. Most concern
about social diversity arises from the challenges of integrating non-EU nationals within
member states. Standardized estimates about the exact size of this population derived from
official national statistics are not available, but it is commonly suggested that Muslims
constitute the largest minority religion within the European Union (BBC News, 2005).
Europe has a long history of engagement with Islam and modern developments are rooted
in the era of colonial rule; Britain, France and the Netherlands, in particular, experienced
large Muslim immigrations after the collapse of their empires.Others came to Europe in the
1950s and 1960s to fill labor shortages. The overall size of the population has also risen
because of high birth rates among immigrant families, and refugee flight from impoverished
and unstable home countries, such as in the Balkans andAfghanistan.Migration has brought
a particularly rapid and profound transformation of many EU societies, nowhere exempli-
fied more dramatically than in poorer city outskirts where Muslim communities have
concentrated, such as the population of Turkish guest workers in Berlin, Bremen and
Frankfurt; the Moroccan, Turk and Sudanese communities in Rotterdam; Franco-
Maghrebis in Marseilles; and Bangladeshis and Pakistanis in the East End of London,
Bradford or Leicester (Al-Azmeh and Fokas, 2007; Modood et al., 2006; Nonneman et al.,
1998). In response to these developments,Western governments have sought to implement
effective policies for managing diversity, while preserving social cohesion, minimizing
discrimination and promoting inter-faith tolerance (Gallis, 2005; Sinno, 2009).
What has been the impact of these trends on cultural integration? The theoretical and
empirical literature is divided between theories of cultural integration, suggesting that
migrants gradually absorb the values and lifestyles of their countries of destination, and
theories of multiculturalism, which suggest that enduring traditions, shared identities and
deep-rooted values persist for many minority groups for many decades, or even for
centuries (Holton, 2000).
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Do Migrants Gradually Absorb the Culture of Their New Destination?
During the early twentieth century, the Chicago School of sociology sought to understand
how successive waves of European immigrants became assimilated or integrated into
American society (Kivisto, 2002). TheAmerican historical experience from the colonial era
until the First World War suggested that migrant populations gradually came to share
mainstream values, ways of life and beliefs prevailing in their host society, usually through
an intergenerational process (Alba and Nee, 2003). The mainstream agencies of cultural
transmission, including schools, the mass media, participation in the labor force and
bridging social networks in the local community, facilitated the socialization of second- and
third-generation minority groups. During the early twentieth century, assimilation theory
was the dominant sociological paradigm for understanding historic waves of immigration
by Italian-Americans, Irish-Americans, Polish-Americans and other European émigrés.
As a normative ideal, the concept fell out of favor in America during the 1960s, driven
in large part by the civil rights and black power movement, and by the growing diversity
of new waves of migrants from around the world, as well as by a reaction discrediting
ethnocentric assumptions about the superiority of Anglo-American culture in the United
States (Glazer, 2002). In recent years, however, several social scientists have produced revised
and updated versions of the assimilation thesis, stripped of its normative connotations. The
most comprehensive and analytically rigorous theory, developed by Richard Alba and
Victor Nee (2003), identifies a variety of mechanisms that facilitate the integration of
minorities into American society, emphasizing the role of human capital, social networks
and the institutional arrangements of the state and labor market. Alejandro Portes and Min
Zhou (1993) suggest that segmented assimilation typically occurs for second-generation
immigrants in the United States, emphasizing that integration into the workforce or
community is far from automatic, and it occurs at varying rates for different types of ethnic
group. European scholars have been drawing upon these ideas to understand integration
occurring among second-generation groups in the EU (Thomson and Crul, 2007). Com-
pared with Europe, however, the United States may prove to be distinctive in its more
tolerant cultural attitudes towards migrants, as a society founded historically on the prin-
ciple of open borders to diverse flows of immigrants.
Most empirical research testing evidence for patterns of cultural integration has com-
pared populations within specific countries but several studies have used cross-national
surveys to examine these issues. Support for the thesis is provided by Ronald Inglehart and
Christopher Welzel (2005) who analyze plural societies containing large numbers of two
long-standing religious communities, comparing Catholics and Protestants, Hindus and
Muslims, and Christians and Muslims.Evidence from theWVS/EVS (1999–2001) indicates
that religious traditions have historically shaped national cultures – but today their impact
is transmitted mainly through nationwide institutions, to the population as a whole.
Historically Catholic or Protestant or Islamic societies show very distinctive values, but the
differences between Catholics and Protestants and Muslims within given societies proved
relatively small. For example, the basic values of German Catholics were closer to those of
German Protestants than they were to those of Catholics in other countries: the German
Catholics were much more German than Catholic. The same is true in the US,Switzerland,
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the Netherlands and other religiously mixed societies: Catholics tend to be slightly more
traditional than their Protestant compatriots in these countries, but they do not fall into the
historically Catholic cultural zone or anywhere near it. Rather surprisingly, this also holds
true for the differences between Hindus and Muslims in India, and Christians and Muslims
in Nigeria: the basic values of Nigerian Muslims are closer to those of their Christian
compatriots than they are to those of Indian Muslims. Similar patterns exist for other
variables as well: educational, generational, occupational and ethnic differences on the two
value dimensions of traditional versus secular-rational authority and survival versus self-
expression values are much smaller within than between societies. Living in a given country
has a stronger impact on people’s belief systems than their specific type of faith, lending
support to the integration theory.
Alejandro Moreno (2005) obtained related findings when he compared Mexicans living
in Mexico, Mexicans living in the US and non-Hispanic US citizens. Mexicans in the
United States were divided into two subgroups, those who have lived in the US for more
than twenty years, and those who have lived there for less than twenty years. He finds that
Mexicans living in the US have values that are slightly closer to those of Anglo-Americans
than to those of Mexicans living in Mexico; and that Mexicans who have lived in the US
for more than twenty years have values that are slightly closer to those of the Americans
than are those of Mexicans who have lived there for less than twenty years. Juan Díez
Nicolás (2003; 2005) made similar comparisons between the social and political values of
the Spanish public; the values of immigrants to Spain from Latin America, North Africa,
Eastern Europe, sub-SaharanAfrica andAsia; and the values of the public in the immigrants’
countries of origin.He obtains comparable findings: the values of the immigrants generally
fall about halfway between those of the Spanish public and those of their country of origin,
but often tend to be somewhat closer to those of their current host country.
These findings lend support to the integration thesis; nevertheless further analysis is
required to see whether patterns found for these groups also apply to short-term change
among recent Muslim migrant populations. The idea of ‘segmented assimilation’ developed
by Portes and Zhou (1993) holds that minority groups integrate at different rates; in
particular, professional and entrepreneurial immigrants usually assimilate their host society’s
values much faster than those at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy or jobless. It is
therefore unclear whether patterns of successful integration, for example those observed for
professional and middle-class Jewish, Hispanic or Asian communities in America, also hold
for Muslim minorities in Europe, who often come from far poorer developing societies
characterized by lower levels of education and literacy. AsAlba and Nee argue, groups’ rates
of assimilation typically differ due to factors such as reservoirs of human capital (educa-
tional, vocational and linguistic skills), economic capital (socio-economic status, economic
resources) and social capital (social and organizational networks).National groups also differ
in how far the values of their countries of origin are congruent with those that predominate
in their host society; for example, Polish workers living in Dublin share a common Catholic
faith and standards of education, literacy and income that could facilitate integration far
more than would be the case with Bangladeshis moving to London. The integration thesis
predicts several propositions open to testing with further empirical evidence in this study.
In particular, where substantial inter-societal gaps exist between Western and Islamic
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cultures, such as in attitudes towards the family, marriage and the roles of women,
assimilation theory predicts that migrants will gradually come to share the predominant
values in their country of destination.
Or toWhat Extent do Migrants Carry Their Original Culture with Them?
Yet alternative theories of multiculturalism suggest that Muslim migrants, who have
acquired deep-rooted and enduring social norms and cultural values through processes of
childhood socialization within the family, local community and country, will carry their
culture with them when they travel. In this view, persisting ethnic subcultures in multi-
cultural societies, or even deepening divergence between minority and majority commu-
nities, seems the most likely scenario. Benedict Anderson (1983) argues that national
cultures and collective identities are shaped by common histories, shared languages and
deep-rooted religious traditions that persist for centuries. Supporting this claim, empirical
analyses by Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson (2006) trace contemporary cross-
national differences in economic development and levels of democracy to cultural and
institutional differences (or ‘nation-specific factors’) established as much as 500 years ago.
The experience of migration to another country may strengthen the awareness and
importance of regional, national or religious identities, rather than weakening them (Gills,
2002; Pearse, 2004; Rusciano, 2006). Historically, traditional ideas of assimilation within
American society came under challenge during the 1960s, and the core idea was politically
discredited, not least by the persistent structural inequalities that continued to be experi-
enced by African-Americans (Glazer, 2002).
Some empirical evidence also supports observations about enduring cultural differences;
Tom Rice and Jan Feldman (1997), analyzing cumulated data from the General Social
Survey, find strong correlations between the values of various ethnic groups in the US and
the values prevailing in their countries of origin – two or three generations after their
families migrated to the US. Ethnographic studies of disaffected Muslim youth, such as
Bangladeshis in the UK, report that these groups are turning to revivalist Islam in reaction
to political and cultural alienation from theWest (Kibria, 2008). Analysis of the UK Fourth
National Survey of Ethnic Minorities found that Muslims integrate less fully, and more
slowly, than other non-Muslim migrants (Asian, Hindu and Caribbean) (Bisin et al., 2008).
In spring 2006, Pew surveys compared public opinion in four European countries (Britain,
France,Germany and Spain) alongside Muslim minorities in these countries, reporting that
both groups perceived a sense of growing Islamic identity and concern about Islamic
extremists (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2006). The majority of Europeans expressed
doubts that Muslims coming into their countries wanted to adopt their national customs
and way of life. A subsequent Pew survey in fall 2008 reported that many Europeans also
viewed Muslims in an increasingly negative light, especially in France, Germany and Spain
(Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2008). As mentioned earlier, the incidence of radical protest
involving inter-communal violence, and cases of outright terrorist incidents involving small
groups of militant Muslims, lend further plausibility to the divergence argument (Bawer,
2007; Coolsaet, 2008).
There is also systematic evidence that basic cultural values can be remarkably enduring
– especially where colonial settlements form the majority population in new settings.
BETWEEN ORIGINS AND DESTINATIONS 235
© 2012 The Authors. Political Studies © 2012 Political Studies Association
POLITICAL STUDIES: 2012, 60(2)
Support for this claim is demonstrated by the way that colonization from the British Isles
or from the Iberian Peninsula seems to have left an impact on the prevailing contemporary
values of English-speaking and Latin American societies, an impact that remains clear and
distinctive centuries after colonies achieved independence. Thus, analyzing data from the
1990Values Surveys, Inglehart found evidence that colonial immigrants from given coun-
tries tend to bring the values of their society of origin to the new setting, and that these
values seem to persist over long periods of time: in global perspective, the basic values of the
peoples of Latin American countries were relatively similar to each other, and to the values
of the publics of Spain and Portugal (Inglehart, 1997). A similar pattern emerged in the
existence of an English-speaking cultural zone, where the publics of Great Britain and
Ireland, the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand showed relatively similar religious,
political, economic, social and sexual norms. Analysis of data from subsequent waves of the
Values Surveys confirms that these findings are robust over time (Inglehart and Baker, 2000;
Inglehart andWelzel, 2005).
If the multiculturalism thesis is correct, then where substantial cultural differences exist
between countries of origin and countries of destination, migrants will express values that
are closer to those predominating in their country of origin, rather than to those of their
destination. Moreover any significant cultural differences among majority and minority
populations are not expected to diminish among second- and third-generation migrants;
indeed if alienation from the West has occurred, as some observations suggest, then this
could even potentially strengthen Muslim identities among younger populations.
Comparative Framework, Evidence and Research Design
What research design is best suited to analyze the empirical evidence? Much previous
survey research seeking to understand these issues has focused on public opinion towards
immigration within each host society; for example, Zan Strabac and Ola Listhaug (2008)
used the European Social Survey to examine prejudicial attitudes towards ethnic minority
populations, while Costas Panagopoulos (2006) examined American attitudes towards
Muslims and Arab-Americans in the aftermath of 9/11. Studies have also analyzed public
attitudes inWestern countries towards the related topics of labor mobility, trade liberaliza-
tion and economic protectionism (Edwards, 2006; Kaltenthaler et al., 2004; Mayda and
Rodrik, 2005). Gallya Lahav (2004) examines European preferences for particular types of
immigration policy, at mass and elite levels, showing that many Europeans find immigrants
to be threatening. It is important to understand public opinion in Western societies, as
perceptions of immigration comprise one of the factors facilitating or restricting processes
of integration. But this only reflects one side of the relationship, rather than directly
comparing the cultural values of minority and majority populations.
Within-societal comparisons of majority and minority publics have also often been
employed.Given the limited sample size of most standard nationwide social surveys, analysis
is usually based on specially designed matching surveys that over-sample specific types of
minority population. These are exemplified by studies of ethnic minorities, such as Latinos
or Muslim American voters, compared with the Anglo-American electorate within the
United States (Ayers, 2007). Cross-national studies have also analyzed societal cultures,
including a growing body of surveys of public opinion in diverse Muslim-majority
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countries, facilitating comparison with cultures in Western countries (Esposito and
Mogahed, 2008; Furia and Lucas, 2008). Our earlier analysis based on the 1999–2001
WVS/EVS documented almost universal support for democratic values in thirteen Islamic
societies, with attitudes towards gender equality and sexual liberalization forming the
sharpest cleavage dividing Islamic and Western societies (Inglehart and Norris, 2003b).
Subsequent studies have further confirmed these patterns in Muslim-majority countries
(Dixon, 2008;Meyer et al., 2008).Nevertheless these conclusions need to be revisited, since
others have argued that the comparison of Muslim majority societies disguises important
subcultures, as attitudes towards democracy and gender equality in the Arab region differ
from those of Muslim societies in Asia and elsewhere (Rizzo et al., 2007). Muslim opinion
may also vary by the type of state, including among theocracies where Islam is the official
religion, such as Iran, absolute autocracies such as Saudi Arabia, and electoral democracies
such as Turkey with secular constitutions and a division between mosque and state (Stepan
and Robertson, 2003). Just as Evangelicals, Lutherans and Roman Catholics hold distinct
theological beliefs and social values, so too predominately Shi’a and Sunni Muslim societies
may prove far from homogeneous in their cultures.
Any satisfactory test of these theories, however, needs to examine cultural values at the
societal level, as well as among majority and minority populations within countries. This
article tests alternative propositions by examining evidence from five pooled waves of the
WorldValues Survey and EuropeanValues Study, a global investigation of socio-cultural and
political change from 1981 to 2007. This project has conducted representative national
surveys of the basic values and beliefs of the publics in more than 90 independent countries,
containing over 88 per cent of the world’s population and covering all six inhabited
continents. The project builds on the European Values Survey, first carried out in 22
countries in 1981. A second wave of surveys was completed in 43 countries in 1990–1. A
third wave was carried out in 55 nations in 1995–6, and a fourth wave, in 59 countries, took
place in 1999–2001. The fifth wave covering 55 countries was conducted in 2005–7.3
Most importantly for our purposes, the survey includes systematic data on public opinion
in many diverse Islamic states containing Muslim-plurality populations, providing the
broadest comparison available from any existing social survey. Societies in theWorldValues
Survey are classified by their predominant religion, as listed in Table 1. Based on estimates
of the religious population contained in the CIAWorld Factbook, the survey covers twenty
Islamic nations, defined as those where the Muslim population is the largest plurality (which
may also contain substantial minorities of other faiths). It is important to compare a wide
variety of societies to examine the diversity of attitudes and values found among Muslim
nations around the globe (Moaddel, 2007). TheWorldValues Survey includes Arab states,
both majority Sunni (such as Jordan,Algeria,Morocco and Egypt) and majority Shi’a (such
as Iran and Iraq), as well as countries in Asia (Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Bangladesh,
Malaysia), Central Europe (Bosnia Herzegovina,Albania) and in sub-Saharan Africa (Mali,
Nigeria, Burkina Faso). The survey also covered states that have adopted Islam as the
foundation of political institutions (such as SaudiArabia and Pakistan), societies where Islam
is the official or established state religion (including Egypt, Bangladesh and Malaysia) and
secular states where the constitution is neutral towards religion (such as Turkey,Azerbaijan
and Indonesia). TheWorldValues Survey contains eight of the ten most populous Muslim
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nations around the globe, including the top three, Indonesia, Pakistan and Bangladesh. This
variation is important as Helen Rizzo et al. (2007) have noted that the comparison of all
Islamic societies may overlook important distinctions, since attitudes towards gender equal-
ity and sexuality inArab cultures are expected to be substantially more traditional than those
of Asian Islamic cultures.
The WVS/EVS survey covers societies with all levels of economic and human devel-
opment, including many affluent Western countries, such as the US, Japan and Switzerland,
with per capita annual incomes over $40,000, together with middle-level Muslim countries
including Malaysia, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, as well as poorer Muslim societies, such as
Bangladesh,Mali and Burkina Faso,with per capita annual incomes of $500 or less. In terms
of regimes, Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy,which Freedom House classifies as one of
the world’s most restrictive states in respect of civil liberties and political rights, but the
World Values Survey also monitored public opinion in the democratic states of Mali and
Indonesia, as well as the secular state of Turkey.4
What types of cultural values are selected for comparison? The choice is important,
because some types seem to be more deeply embedded in people’s personality structure than
others, making them relatively resistant to change when an individual moves into a new
Table 1: Classification of Countries under Comparison
Countries of origin Countries of destination
Country % Muslims Global region Country % Muslims Global region
1 Iraq 98.9 Middle East 1 France 1.4 Western Europe
2 Algeria 98.0 North Africa 2 Finland 1.4 Scandinavia
3 Iran 97.7 Middle East 3 Belgium 1.2 Western Europe
4 Saudi Arabia 97.0 Middle East 4 Britain 1.0 Western Europe
5 Jordan 96.9 Middle East 5 Australia 0.9 Asia-Pacific
6 Egypt 94.3 North Africa 6 Netherlands 0.7 Western Europe
7 Mali 93.0 West Africa 7 Germany 0.7 Western Europe
8 Indonesia 92.2 South East Asia 8 Canada 0.7 North America
9 Azerbaijan 91.0 Central Asia 9 Switzerland 0.6 Western Europe
10 Bangladesh 88.7 South Asia 10 Luxembourg 0.6 Western Europe
11 Turkey 81.7 Central Asia 11 N. Zealand 0.3 Asia-Pacific
12 Kyrgyzstan 74.3 Central Asia 12 Denmark 0.3 Scandinavia
13 Pakistan 69.6 South Asia 13 Norway 0.3 Scandinavia
14 Albania 64.3 Central Europe 14 Sweden 0.2 Scandinavia
15 Morocco 63.6 North Africa 15 USA 0.2 North America
16 Malaysia 57.4 South East Asia 16 Austria 0.1 Western Europe
17 Burkina Faso 53.3 Sub-Saharan Africa 17 Spain 0.1 Mediterranean Europe
18 Bosnia Herz. 48.9 Central Europe 18 Ireland 0.0 Western Europe
19 Tanzania 40.1 East Africa 19 Greece 0.0 Mediterranean Europe
20 Nigeria 28.1 West Africa 20 Iceland 0.0 Scandinavia
21 Italy 0.0 Mediterranean Europe
22 Portugal 0.0 Mediterranean Europe
Source: Pooled World Values Survey, 1981–2007.
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situation. Following Peter Berger andThomas Luckman (1967), andThorleif Pettersson,we
hypothesize that orientations that are established in one’s primary socialization, relatively
early in life, such as gender roles, ethnic identities and religious values, are likely to become
part of one’s core identity, which is relatively resistant to change. Conversely, the formative
period for political and economic values seems to occur later in life; such orientations,
instilled in one’s secondary socialization, are more open to change (Halman and Pettersson,
2003; Pettersson, 1988). Consequently, we expect that migrants would be more likely to
change their values concerning politics than those concerning religion and gender roles.
Previous research seems to support this expectation (Inglehart and Norris,2003b;Pettersson,
2007). Although Muslim publics clearly support the goal of democracy, a substantial cultural
gap exists between Islamic and Western societies concerning gender equality and sexual
liberalization. Moreover, this gap seems to have widened in recent years because, while
advanced industrial societies in North America,Western Europe, Japan and Australia have
experienced rapid cultural change on issues such as tolerance of homosexuality, divorce and
gender equality, the values of pre-industrial societies have been changing relatively slowly.
A series of thirteen items were selected to monitor cultural values towards gender and
sexuality, religiosity and democracy, and their dimensions were examined using factor
analysis. The results presented in Table 2 show that the items monitoring tolerance of
Table 2: Dimensions of Cultural Value Scales
Religiosity
Sexual
liberalization
Gender
equality
Democratic
values
Importance of God scale 0.719 -0.434
Religious identity 0.705
Importance of religion 0.677 -0.452
Frequency of attending religious services 0.586
Take moments of prayer or meditation? 0.582
How often think about meaning of life 0.491
Justifiability abortion 0.753
Justifiability divorce 0.745
Justifiability homosexuality 0.702
Men make better political leaders than women 0.742
University education more important for a boy 0.719
Men should have more right to a job than women 0.669
Having a strong leader rule without elections 0.772
Having experts, not government, take decisions 0.686
Having the army rule 0.611
Approve of having a democratic system 0.439 0.419
% of variance 16.7 16.5 13.4 10.9
Notes: Individual-level Principal Component Factor Analysis was used to develop the scales with Varimax Rotation and Kaiser
Normalization, excluding coefficients below 0.40. See the Technical Appendix for the detailed survey items.
Source: Pooled World Values Survey, 1981–2007.
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homosexuality, abortion and divorce formed one consistent dimension, representing posi-
tive orientations towards issues of sexual liberalization and choice. The items concerning
gender equality tapped into approval of traditional or egalitarian roles for men and women
in the workforce, elected office and university education, forming a consistent scale that we
have used in an earlier detailed study (Inglehart and Norris, 2003a). Support for democratic
values and principles was monitored using four items: approval of having a democratic
political system; agreement or disagreement with questions about having a strong leader
who does not have to bother with elections; having experts take decisions instead of
government; and having military rule. The separate dimensions were summed and stan-
dardized into 100-point scales, for ease of comparison, with the full items listed in the
Technical Appendix.
Results and Findings
The descriptive mean position of the groups on the four 100-point value scales is shown
in Figure 2, without applying any controls. The strength and significance of the asso-
ciation was measured by ANOVA. The results of the societal-level comparison demon-
strate the existence of a sizeable (25 percentage point) culture gap between Islamic
Figure 2: Cultural Values by Type of Society and Religious Identity
Notes: For the classification, see Figure 1. For the value scales, see the Technical Appendix. Each value scale is standardized to 100
points for ease of comparison. ANOVA tests for differences in means across groups were performed. The strength of association
coefficient was measured by eta coefficients, which were statistically significant in every case at the 1 per cent level.
Source: Pooled World Values Survey, 1981–2007.
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countries of origin and Western countries of destination on issues of religiosity, sexual
liberalization and gender equality values. On questions such as tolerance of homosexu-
ality, divorce and abortion, for example,Western Christians proved twice as liberal as the
more traditional Muslims living in Islamic societies. A far smaller (ten percentage point)
gap exists between Islamic andWestern countries in support for democratic values, where
there was widespread approval. This pattern confirms previous comparisons based on the
1999–2001WVS/EVS, where the largest gap between Islamic societies and the West was
over ‘eros not demos’ (Inglehart and Norris, 2003b; Norris and Inglehart, 2002). The
marked societal contrasts in levels of religiosity have also been documented earlier in
detail, with most Western nations proving increasingly secular in religious values and
practices, exemplified by the steady erosion of regular attendance at church services in
European societies (Norris and Inglehart, 2004).
More importantly for the purposes of this study, the position of Muslim migrants proved
to be located approximately halfway between the dominant values prevailing within their Destinations
and their Origins. This suggests that Muslims are not exceptionally resistant in levels of
integration, as Alberto Bisin et al. (2008) suggest; instead, the centrist position documented
in other studies for Mexican and for LatinAmerican migrants also applies to this population
(Moreno, 2005).Migrants do not wholly reject their cultural roots, it seems, but neither do
they fully adopt the values of their host societies. This pattern was clear and consistent
across all the indicators, although the exact location of migrants varied slightly across
different cultural scales. It is also striking that although much of the European debate has
focused on the attitudes and practices towards the roles of men and women, it appears that
on the gender equality scale, Muslim minorities are in fact far closer to Western than to
Islamic publics.
To examine the national variations more closely, we constructed scatter plots to
compare the mean positions of countries on the gender equality and sexual liberalization
scales (Figure 3) and on the democracy and religiosity value scales (Figure 4). In both
cases, we find a clear clustering of societies by the predominant type of religion; thus
while the Scandinavian countries of Sweden and Norway prove exceptionally egalitarian
in their attitudes towards sexuality and gender, the other affluent Western nations such
as France, the Netherlands and Switzerland follow close behind. By contrast the Muslim
countries, in the bottom left quadrant of Figure 3, prove far more traditional on these
issues, notably Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt. Asian and African
Islamic societies are slightly more liberal, but they still all remain below the Western
societies in this regard. Figure 4, comparing democratic values and religiosity, shows a
slightly looser scatter of societies; for example, among the Islamic societies, Tanzania,
Azerbaijan and Pakistan show exceptionally high approval of democratic values. Never-
theless, while a less clear-cut division, there is also a pattern apparent with most Muslim
societies clustered in the bottom right quadrant, showing less support for democratic
ideals and greater religiosity.
So far we have examined the descriptive means at societal levels, but of course before
we can attribute these to the type of predominant religion in each society, or to indi-
vidual Muslim religious identities, we need to control for a number of important vari-
ables. After all, Muslim migrants may well prove distinctive from their compatriots for
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many reasons; for example, younger groups, and those with greater educational qualifi-
cations or higher socio-economic resources, may well find it easier to relocate. The use
of hierarchical linear models, in particular multi-level regression analysis, is an appropriate
technique for comparing the impact of societal-level and individual-level factors simul-
taneously.We theorize that Muslim religious identities will have a direct effect on indi-
vidual values. We also predict that living in Islamic societies will be important for the
diffusion of cultural values.
To operationalize these factors, the key models involve measurement at two distinct
levels. A representative sample of individual respondents (level 1) is nested within
national-level contexts (level 2). The WVS/EVS was conducted among a representative
random sample of the adult population within each country. Given the use of multi-level
data, HLM are most appropriate for analysis, including multi-level regression analysis.
Figure 3: Sexual Liberalization and Gender Equality Values by Type of Society
Source: Pooled World Values Survey, 1981–2007.
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The models in this study use restricted maximum likelihood techniques (REML) to
estimate direct and cross-level effects for hierarchical data. Individual respondents are thus
grouped into countries. Each country has a different set of parameters for the random
factors, allowing intercepts and slopes to vary by nation (Gelman and Hill, 2007; Rauden-
bush and Bryk, 2002). The cultural values under comparison are far from uniform in the
countries under comparison; hence, for example, there are far more egalitarian attitudes
towards gender equality in Northern European and Scandinavian countries than in other
European regions (Inglehart and Norris, 2003a). Similarly, the strength of religiosity
varies substantially among the countries under comparison, such as stark contrasts
between secular Protestant Sweden and Denmark compared with Catholic Italy and
Ireland (Norris and Inglehart, 2004). Thus it is important to use techniques that capture
this cross-national variance. In hierarchical linear models, as is customary, all independent
Figure 4: Democratic and Religious Values by Type of Society
Source: Pooled World Values Survey, 1981–2007.
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variables were centered, by subtracting the grand mean (which becomes zero). The
standardized independent variables all have a standard deviation of 1.0. This process also
helps to guard against problems of collinearity in the independent variables in the ordi-
nary least squares (OLS) models. The independent variables were treated as fixed com-
ponents, reflecting the weighted average for the slope across all groups, while nation was
treated as a random component, capturing the country variability in the slope. The
strength of the beta coefficients (slopes) can be interpreted intuitively as how much
change in the dependent variable is generated by a 1 per cent change in each indepen-
dent variable. The multi-level regression models used in this study usually generate small
differences in the size of the slope coefficient (b) compared with the results of OLS
models, but the average standard errors for level 2 variables tend to be slightly larger. The
process is thus more rigorous and conservative, avoiding Type I errors (false positives,
concluding that a statistically significant difference exists when, in truth, there is no
statistical difference). In the REML model, by contrast, Schwarz’s Bayesian Information
Criterion (BIC) is used, where the model with the lower value is the best fitting.
Level 1 in our core models includes the following individual-level Muslim religious
identities, along with several other standard controls, described in the Technical Appendix,
including male gender (0/1), household income using a 10-point scale, age (in years), the
education scale, marital status, labor force participation and religiosity (the Importance of
God 10-point scale). Level 2 includes national-level variables, including the classification of
societies into Islamic orWestern Christian (see Table 1), based on the religious proportion
of each country’s population. In addition, we also control for the location of Islamic
countries (classified as in the Middle East or elsewhere in the world), to test whether these
societies differ.
Table 3 presents the models predicting cultural values in the Islamic andWestern societies
under comparison. The models show that both individual religious identities and the type
of society influence social values. The type of society, however, consistently provides by far
the stronger effect across all value scales; thus, all other things being equal, living in an
Islamic society makes a person roughly 10 percentage points more conservative towards
sexual morality, about 10 points more religious, roughly 8 percentage points less supportive
of gender equality and 3 points less positive towards democratic values. Being a self-
identified individual Muslim, by contrast, has a significant but far weaker effect, although in
the same direction. These effects remain significant controlling for many other factors that
could plausibly influence social attitudes. The other controls in the models behave mostly
as expected; hence education has a liberal effect across all values, while religiosity is
associated with more traditional values. Support for tolerance of sexual liberalization values
was strengthened by education, household income and labor force participation, while
support was weaker among the older generation, those who were married, men and the
most devout. Other exploratory models, not reproduced here, found that similar results
were generated controlling for other factors, such as use of the mass media and familiarity
with a European language, which could facilitate processes of cultural assimilation. A
comparison of the standardized coefficients shows that the experience of living in either an
Islamic or Western society had a far stronger effect than any other characteristic under
comparison.
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To see whether generational processes are gradually closing any remaining value gaps,
Figure 5 illustrates the attitudes by age category and by type of social group. The graphs
show that across each of the value scales, the societal-level gaps largely persist (concerning
democracy), or even widen (for sexual liberalization and religiosity), by age group. On
religiosity, for example, the younger population inWestern societies is increasingly secular
Table 3: Full Model Predicting Cultural Values
Gender
equality
Liberal sexual
morality
Democratic
values
Religious
values
Predictor variables
Muslim religious identity -0.55*** -0.59*** -0.62*** 2.43***
(0.099) (0.123) (0.086) (0.105)
Islamic society -8.22*** -10.24* -3.23*** 10.67***
(0.070) (1.06) (0.940) (1.67)
Individual-level controls
Age (years) -0.96*** -2.01*** 0.97*** 3.31***
(0.070) (0.078) (0.054) (0.068)
Gender (male = 1) -3.83*** -2.08*** 0.52*** -1.72***
(0.060) (0.069) (0.047) (0.060)
Household income 10-pt scale 1.06*** 1.05*** 0.76*** -0.777***
(0.066) (0.074) (0.051) (0.065)
Education 9-pt scale 3.06*** 2.98*** 2.63*** 0.31***
(0.066) (0.078) (0.050) (0.067)
Labor force participation 0.72*** 1.42*** 0.11* -0.43***
(0.063) (0.073) (0.050) (0.064)
Marital status -0.52** -1.07*** 0.15*** 0.49***
(0.062) (0.071) (0.049) (0.062)
2nd-generation immigrant 0.17** 0.45*** 0.03 0.093*
(0.043) (0.053) (0.037) (0.045)
Religiosity -1.95*** -7.67*** -0.48***
(0.083) (0.087) (0.061)
National-level controls
Middle East -2.58** -0.090 -1.26 -0.128
(1.26) (1.28) (1.07) (1.73)
Constant (intercept) 73.1 44.3 75.55 65.4
Schwarz BIC 654,224 771,651 761,323 729,290
N respondents 78,037 87,694 94,018 85,781
N nations 31 38 38 34
Notes: All independent variables were standardized using mean centering (z-scores). Models present the results of the REML
multi-level regression models including the beta coefficient (the standard error below in parentheses), and the significance. The
100-point scales are constructed from the items listed in Table 2. *p > 0.05; **p > 0.01; ***p > 0.001.
Source: Pooled World Values Survey, 1981–2007.
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compared with older generations.By contrast, Islamic Muslims, andWestern Muslims, show
a far slower process of age-related change towards religious values. Similar observations can
be made concerning attitudes towards sexual liberalization; here youngerWestern Muslims
are indeed becoming more tolerant than middle-aged and older generations, but the change
amongWestern publics is far greater. As a result, althoughWestern Muslims are consistently
located between Islamic and Western societies, there is no evidence that generational
change, by itself, will transform the situation so that the cultural differences between
Muslim migrants and Western publics will disappear: younger Westerners are adopting
modern values even more swiftly than their Muslim peers.
Conclusions and Implications
There has been widespread public debate about how farWestern societies can manage the
growing social diversity produced by the rising influx of migrants flowing across national
borders and, in particular, the rapidly expanding Muslim population living within Europe.
During earlier historical eras, the United States assimilated successive waves of people,
whether Irish, Italian or Polish Catholics, Central European Jews or Scandinavian Luther-
ans, as well as later populations drawn from around the globe,whetherVietnamese refugees,
Korean shopkeepers and Indian software engineers or Liberian, Colombian or Mexican
laborers and service workers. Can historically more homogeneous European cultures, such
as Sweden, France and Germany, also manage to accommodate greater social diversity
Figure 5: Values by Age Group and Type of Societal-Religious Identity
Source: Pooled World Values Survey, 1981–2007.
246 PIPPA NORRIS AND RONALD F. INGLEHART
© 2012 The Authors. Political Studies © 2012 Political Studies Association
POLITICAL STUDIES: 2012, 60(2)
successfully? Or will immigration deepen cultural tensions, social instability and intra-
communal conflict in Europe, especially when tested under conditions of deep-rooted
economic recession and joblessness?
As we demonstrate, cultural cleavages do exist. They are not monolithic. The largest
differences between Muslim andWestern societies are found in religiosity, gender roles and
sexual norms. This does not mean that migrants are constructing a subculture that is
entirely separate from the mainstream national cultures of Western societies; instead,
Muslim migrants living inWestern societies are located roughly in the center of the cultural
spectrum, located between the publics living in Islamic andWestern societies. It is entirely
possible – indeed, we think it rather likely – that some degree of self-selection may be
involved: those who choose to immigrate to the US or to Spain may already have values
that are relatively compatible with those of their future host country.But even if this is true,
these findings contradict the idea that immigrants simply import an unmodified version of
the values of their own country into their new host country. In the long term, the basic
cultural values of migrants appear to change in conformity with the predominant culture
of each society.
Nevertheless, substantial national differences are apparent, and the gap between Muslim
and Western societies is particularly large. They do not concern fundamental disagree-
ment about whether democracy is a desirable form of government. But they do involve
tolerance of sexual liberalization and women’s equality – and tolerance is a particularly
crucial aspect of a democratic political culture. Do such cultural differences necessarily
lead to tensions or even clashes? No. Under high levels of existential insecurity, xeno-
phobia and intolerance are particularly intense and likely to lead to violence. Conversely,
conditions of security are conducive to relative tolerance of diversity; indeed, at high
levels of existential security, cultural pluralism is regarded as enriching the diversity of
lifestyles, the range of choices that are open to people. Cultural differences are a potential
fault-line that demagogues can exploit to inflame hatred between groups. But there is
nothing inevitable about cultural conflict. Depending on conditions, diversity can be seen
either as threatening or as a positive contribution towards the innovation and creativity
that make society and economies adapt successfully to new challenges in a globalized
world.
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Technical Appendix: Concepts and Measures
Variable Definitions, coding and sources
Per capita GDP Measured in constant international $ in Purchasing Power Parity. Various years. Source: The World Bank;
World Development Indicators.
Type of religion V184: ‘Do you belong to a religious denomination? [IF YES] Which one?’ Coded: No, not a member; Roman
Catholic; Protestant; Orthodox (Russian/Greek/etc.); Jewish; Muslim; Hindu; Buddhist; Other. Source:
World Values Survey.
Type of predominant
religion worldwide
The classification of the major religion (adhered to by the plurality groups in the population) in all 193
states around the world is based on the CIA, The World Factbook, 2009 (Washington, DC: Central
Intelligence Agency). Source: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook
Gender equality scale The combined 100-pt gender equality scale is based on the following 3 items: MENPOL Q118: ‘On the
whole, men make better political leaders than women do’. (Agree coded low); MENJOBS Q78: ‘When
jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women’. (Agree coded low); BOYEDUC Q.119:
‘A university education is more important for a boy than a girl’. (Agree coded low). Source: World
Values Survey.
Sexual liberalization
values scale
‘Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified (10),
never justified (1), or somewhere in-between, using this card ... Abortion, Homosexuality, Divorce ’.
Source: World Values Survey.
Democratic values
scale
V148–151. ‘I’m going to describe various types of political system and ask what you think about each as a
way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or
very bad way of governing this country? Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with
parliament and elections/Having experts, not government, make decisions/Having the army rule/Having
a democratic political system? ’ Source: World Values Survey.
Religious values
scale
This is a composite 100-point scale constructed by summing the following items: Importance of God,
Religious identity, Importance of religion, Frequency of attending religious services, Take moments of
prayer or meditation, How often think about meaning of life?
Occupational class Coded for the respondent’s occupation. ‘In which profession/occupation do you, or did you, work? ’ The
scale is coded into 4 categories: Professional/manager (1); Other non-manual (2); Skilled non-manual
(3); Unskilled manual worker (4). Source: World Values Survey.
Paid work status V220. ‘Are you employed now or not? ’ Coded full-time, part-time or self-employed (1), other (0). Source:
World Values Survey.
Education V217. ‘What is the highest educational level that you have ever attained? ’ Coded on a 9-point scale from
no formal education (1) to university level with degree (9). Source: World Values Survey.
Age Age coded in continuous years derived from date of birth. Source: World Values Survey.
Age groups: younger (18–29), middle (30–49) and older (50+).
Language V222. ‘What language do you normally speak at home? ’ Code English = 1, else = 0. Source: World Values
Survey.
Religiosity V192 ‘How important is God in your life?’ 10-point scale.
Household income V253 ‘On this card is a scale of incomes on which 1 indicates the “lowest income decile” and 10 the
“highest income decile” in your country. We would like to know in what group your household is.
Please, specify the appropriate number, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that
come in.’ (Code one number). Source: World Values Survey.
Education scale V238. ‘What is the highest educational level that you have attained? ’ [NOTE: if respondent indicates to be
a student, code highest level s/he expects to complete]:
(1) No formal education; (2) Incomplete primary school; (3) Complete primary school; (4) Incomplete
secondary school: technical/vocational type; (5) Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type;
(6) Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type; (7) Complete secondary: university-preparatory
type; (8) Some university-level education, without degree; (9)University-level education, with degree.
Source: World Values Survey.
Note: Full details of the World Values Survey codebooks and questionnaires can be found at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.com
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Notes
1 It should be noted that throughout the article the term ‘Islamic’ is used to refer to Muslim majority societies, and it is not used
to describe the official religion or policies of the state, or the relation between religious and political authorities. ‘Muslim’ is used
throughout to refer to individuals who identify with the Muslim faith.
2 Eurostat, European Statistics. ec.europa.edu/eurostat. For more detailed figures, see The European Migration Network, http://
www.european-migration-network.org/
3 Full methodological details about the World Values Survey, including the questionnaires, sampling procedures, fieldwork proce-
dures, principle investigators and organization can be found at: http://wvs.isr.umich.edu/wvs-samp.html
4 These regimes are classified according to the 2008 Freedom House assessments of political rights and civil liberties. Freedom
House, Freedom in the World, 2008, http://www.freedomhouse.org
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